The Brain Without the Body? Virtual Reality, Neuroscience and the Living Flesh by Roussel, Marion
 
Angles
New Perspectives on the Anglophone World 
2 | 2016
New Approaches to the Body
The Brain Without the Body? Virtual Reality,







Société des Anglicistes de l'Enseignement Supérieur
 
Electronic reference
Marion Roussel, « The Brain Without the Body? Virtual Reality, Neuroscience and the Living Flesh », 
Angles [Online], 2 | 2016, Online since 01 April 2016, connection on 28 July 2020. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/angles/1872  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/angles.1872 
This text was automatically generated on 28 July 2020.
Angles. New Perspectives on the Anglophone World is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
The Brain Without the Body?





1 “The Brain Without the Body” can strike one as a curious title. It reminds us of the
concept of the “Body without Organs” developed by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze
and  Félix  Guattari  (1980).  I  am  using  this  expression  to  refer  to a  virtual  reality
environment project named AlloBrain@AlloSphere that was conducted between 2005 and
2009 by architect and artist Marcos Novak. I experienced it myself in March 2014 at the
University of California, Santa Barbara.
2 AlloBrain is  an immersive environment modelled from Novak’s brain MRIs and then
extruded in the form of a three-dimensional volume. Its aim is to plunge inside the
architect’s head, in his cerebral space. Since we all have a brain that is a priori similarly
structured, this discovery may be our own as well. However, in this journey beyond the
face, we may find it hard to recognise ourselves. What might be familiar and intimate
turns out to be, in fact, extremely disturbing and unsettling. Within AlloBrain, I had a
strange  and  particular  feeling,  an  uncanny feeling.  The  Uncanny,  first  explored
psychologically by psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch and later developed by Sigmund Freud
(1919), is a form of anxiety, an uneasiness that relates to familiar things when they
appear under a foreign aspect; it emerges when one can no longer recognise what one
perceives, when one appears a stranger to oneself; it designates the part of the hidden
within us and the fear caused by it.
3 According to Jentsch (1906), the first mark of the Uncanny is a moment of intellectual
uncertainty,  or  the  inability  to  overcome  the  ambiguity  and  equivocal  nature  of
meaning. What is this outside meaning that is so disquieting? My aim in this paper is to
offer  the  following  hypothesis:  the  uncanny  effect  produced  by  the  immersion  in
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AlloBrain may  result  from  the  confrontation  between  a  naked  brain  and  subjective
experience, which seems unable to dispose of a physical body that we inhabit entirely
and that inhabits us in return. Thus, what AlloBrain causes may be a real return to the
flesh, this lived-in and living flesh, highlighting a proper body that is still foreign to us,
because  something  always  resists.  Is  that  thing  which  cannot  be  captured  by
digitisation not the phenomenal “I” itself, the “I” by which we experiment our body
and the world? This hypothesis gives us ground to doubt that by uploading our minds
in the machine,  as  some transhuman theorists  would have it,  we could remain the
same.
4 To conduct my analysis, I will first briefly introduce the thoughts that Marcos Novak
develops and  on  which  he  bases  his  practice,  which  is,  as  we  shall  see,  very
experimental. In particular, I will present two virtual reality environments that form
the beginnings  to  AlloBrain,  that  is  to  say  Dancing  with  the  Virtual  Dervish:  Worlds  in
Progress (1991-1994) and Eduction:  The Alien-Within (2001).  I  will  then concentrate on
AlloBrain.  Why did an uncanny feeling seize me when I  experienced it?  Are we not
dealing  with  a  project  meant  to  explain  the  mind through mere  brain  matter,  not
unlike  cognitive  science  or  neuroscience?  These  two  questions  will  structure  my
analysis, focusing on how this particular virtual reality environment makes us think of
the  relationships  between  the  mind  and  the  body  and  between  phenomenal
consciousness, subjective experience and the physical body. I will address the mind-
uploading  fantasy,  suggesting  that  it  could  be  seen  as  a  figure  of  the  crisis  of
inhabitation denounced by Martin Heidegger after World War II.  To conclude, I will
question  the  idea  of  transhumanity  and  posthumanity,  in  relation  with  the
(in)definition of humanity.
 
Dancing with the Virtual Dervish: Worlds in Progress and 
Eduction: The Alien-Within: preludes to 
AlloBrain@AlloSphere
5 For past thirty years, Marcos Novak (1957) has been developing an experimental and
transdisciplinary  practice  at  the  meeting  point  between  architecture,  art,  science,
technology and philosophy, to question the becoming of the digitally-enhanced body.
His  investigations  are  both  philosophical  and  critical,  “regarding  the  role  and  the
impact  of  science  and  technology  on  culture,”  and  empirical  and  experimental,
concerning “artistic horizons opened up by new science technology” (Novak, 2004). He
was one of the first architects, if not the first, to theorise virtual reality environments
as architectural spaces and to consider virtual reality devices as matrices for potential
worlds. According to Novak, virtual reality environments are experimentation spaces
that enable us to push the boundaries of the known world, questioning the possibilities
offered by architecture and expanding the field of human senses (1992). In particular,
what interests Novak is the exploration of the inner worlds of the self, the unknown
and foreign territories concealed in the human psyche. Virtual reality environments
are considered as projection and externalisation media of the private mental space, like
inverted reflections of this interiority. Novak thus refers to them as “esoscopes,” that is
to  say  as  viewing  instruments,  tools  to  make  the  invisible  worlds  hidden  within
ourselves visible (1996). The virtual environments created by the architect appear both
as techniques of dispossession and possession.
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6 In Dancing with the Virtual Dervish: Worlds in Progress, a project conducted between 1991
and 1994, dancers were equipped with head-mounted displays, thereby rendered blind
to the outside world. They were plunged into a vision like whirling dervishes, the Sufi
mystics who seek  to  enter  a  state  of  trance  and to  explore  consciousness  through
dance. Dervishes use dancing because it helps promote their motor ability and their
mental  and  emotional  unity,  allowing  them  to  release  the  tensions  that  would
otherwise  cripple  the  relationship between mind and body.  Dancing  with  the  Virtual
Dervish questions  this  relationship.  In  this  environment,  the  intention  was  not  to
experiment a split between the physical or real body and the mind, rather, the body
was established as the true vehicle of exploration. Experimenters dealt with a sensitive,
a sensual, even an erotic flesh. Indeed, according to Marcos Novak, in Dancing with the
Virtual Dervish, everything hearkened back to incarnation, to the need of the body as
first  interface  and  as  first  medium  of  any  being  in  the  world.  For  the  architect,
immersion in virtual reality is not an immersion in a bodiless or disembodied space: it
is an immersion which occurs with the body, which cannot be done without the body.
However,  in  the  second  environment  that  I  will  describe,  the  importance  of  the
physical  body  appears  greatly  minimized.  This  environment  is  Eduction:  The  Alien-
Within.  It  was  created  by  Marcos  Novak  and  Marcos  Lutyens,  a  media  artist  who
practices hypnosis.
7 Eduction was presented in 2001 at the 49th Biennial of Art in Venice, in Erice (Sicily)
during the second international conference on “Media digitali e psicotecnologie: viaggi
nella mente dei mondi virtuali”1 and in Florence. Like Dancing with the Virtual Dervish, 
Eduction was an “esoscope,” i.e. a tool to explore the unknown territories of the self.
The purpose of this environment was to encounter the other that inhabits our inner
dwelling, in short, to meet our alter ego, this “extime” to borrow a term from Jacques
Lacan (2006: 249), or Freud’s Unheimliche (1919). While in Dancing with the Virtual Dervish
we dealt with a true exploring body, here,  the issue of the body is dismissed. With
Eduction, Novak and Lutyens proposed to submit a volunteer to a state of temporary
catalepsy,  agnosia  and  amnesia  before  projecting  him/her  in  the  virtual  reality
environment. In this experiment, the body was kept almost rigid. It did not move nor
occupy the virtual reality space. While Dancing with the Virtual Dervish was based on
living flesh — reminding us of Federico Garcia Lorca’s statements about the duende2
(2007) —, where everything recalled the body — experiencing the deep entanglement of
flesh and mind as the first place of a being in the world traversed and possessed by life
—, in Eduction, the volunteer no longer had control of his/her body, which was made
passive. Only with his/her facial expressions did the volunteer “move”, progress, or
change the environment through a feedback loop. Facial expressions were captured,
translated  as  data  and  injected  into  the  virtual  reality  environment  to  enable  the
transformation of this environment.
 
AlloBrain@AlloSphere
8 Eduction: The Alien-Within is interesting because it is clear that Marcos Novak began to
focus his attention not on the body as a whole, but on the head and the face. With
AlloBrain@AlloSphere,  finally,  another  step  was  taken  since  the  architect  offered  a
journey beyond the skin, beyond the face, bringing us directly inside a brain. AlloBrain
was developed with the assistance of the Brain Mapping Center of the University of
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California  in  Los  Angeles  (UCLA),  a  neuroscience  research  center  that  uses  brain
imaging to understand the structures and functions of the human brain.3 Its original
aim is not to interpret the data produced and projected in terms of scientific results but
to explore the perspectives opened in this regard by virtual reality environments. The
Brain  Mapping  Center  establishes  itself  as  a  parallel  way  of  investigation  to  hard
science in the understanding of  cognitive and perceptual  mechanisms of  the brain.
AlloBrain was made from Marcos Novak’s brain MRIs that were extruded in the form of
a large-size three-dimensional volume into which one can penetrate.
 
Figure 1: Marcos Novak, AlloBrain@AlloSphere, 2005
Source: http://cyborglitteraire.com/files/2015/06/ROUSSEL-Marion_Le-cerveau-sans-
corps_22.05.15.pdf 
9 To  engage  the  audiovisual  exploration  of  this  “world,”  a  remote  control  allows
“immersents”  (to  borrow  Char  Davies’  term)  to  navigate  the  datascape.  Semi-
autonomous research agents — twelve in number and represented on the projection
surface in the form of small rectangles — are set up, sharing data space with them.
These agents are supervised via a second remote that creates a dynamic man-machine
interaction interface mode based on pattern recognition and pattern searching. The
agents can measure blood flow and their colors change depending on the part of the
brain that is being visited, and reports of the data they collect can be sent on request
(Wakefield et al., 2009).
10 AlloBrain was the first environment set up for the “AlloSphere” device. Housed at the
California  Nanosystems  Institute  building,  at  the  University  of  California  in  Santa
Barbara, the “AlloSphere” experiment is the result of studies conducted by Professor
JoAnn Kuchera-Morin for over 25 years. It is intended for immersion and interaction in
stereoscopic  and  pluriphonic  virtual  environments.  Specifically,  it  is  a  10-meter
diameter spherical projection surface suspended in a three-level cube. The projection
surface  consists  of  two  hemispheres  between  which  a  bridge  can  welcome  fifteen
people  who  can  experience  a  full  immersion,  requiring  little  or  no  equipment,  in
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digitally recreated environments in which one cannot normally go physically. It is a
multi-  and  transdisciplinary  tool  that  has  applications  in  the  fields  of  physics,
nanotechnology and neurotechnology, neurophysiology or cosmology, new materials
or new media (see illustration below). Artistically speaking, the “AlloSphere” allows for
the  exploration  of  avant-garde,  experimentation  and  development  of  new  forms,
modes  and  genres  of  expression  in  the  fields  of  cinema,  architecture,  music,  etc.
Presenting it at a conference, Kuchera-Morin announced:
Imagine if  a  team of physicists could stand inside an atom and watch and hear
electrons spin. Imagine if a group of sculptors could be inside a lattice of atoms and
sculpt with their material. Imagine if a team of surgeons could fly into the brain, as
though it was a world, and see tissues as landscapes, and hear blood density levels
as  music.  This  is  some  of  the  research  that  you're  going  to  see  that  we're
undertaking at the AlloSphere.  (2009a)
 
Figure 2: View of the AlloSphere
Source: Kuchera-Morin (2009a). http://www.sweetspeeches.com/s/191-joann-kuchera-morin-
stunning-data-visualization-in-the-allosphere
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11 AlloBrain constitutes a very special  kind of self-portrait.  Rather than a conventional
representation of the surface and the skin of the artist, it enables us to plunge directly
and physically into the architect’s head. The intention of Eduction was to externalise the
mental space of a volunteer to share it with viewers, drawing a movement from the
inside to the outside. With AlloBrain, this movement is reversed, permitting to enter a
three-dimensional immersive model of a human brain, of Novak’s cerebral space. Thus
it is not an “esoscope” as with Dancing with the Virtual  Dervish and Eduction:  it  is  an
“endoscope”.  The  aim  is  not  to  explore  “esospaces”,  the  spaces  of  the  self,  but
“endospaces”,  that  is  to  say,  in  this  case,  the  unfamiliar  and  invisible  inner-brain
territories.  While  traditional  self-portraits  allow  the  artist  to  see  him/herself  as
another  person sees  him/her,  to  borrow his/her  gaze  in  a  doubling by which,  and
through  reflection,  s/he  can  objectify  him/herself  —  that  is  to  say  grasp  his/her
identity in terms of  sameness and otherness — AlloBrain operates an “unfacing,” to
borrow one of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s expressions: an unveiling or an “un-
concealment” of what is hidden behind Novak’s face. If the portrait is “on the edge of a
material world and another intangible”, if “it is in between a reality where everything
is measurable and the space of a dream in which no aberration is no longer irrefutable”
(Bonafoux,  2004:  41),  what  AlloBrain exposes  is  the  uncovering of  a  strangeness,  an
uncanny  feeling  that  invaginates  everyone  who  experiences  this  immersive
environment.
12 Thus AlloBrain exhibits, and this exhibition does not only concern the architect but each
of us, since we all have a brain that is a priori structured in the same way. Yet, in this
portrait,  we  do  not  recognise  ourselves  or  find  ourselves.  We  have  to  deal  with
something  about  unknown  territories  of  the  body,  about  an  anonymous  and
subterranean singularity which is nevertheless present in all of us, something like a
monstrous  face,  a  “non-face”  which  exceeds  language.  Therefore,  in  my  opinion,
AlloBrain is  an “explicitation” work in which what  is  unfolded seems to  relate  to  a
particular monstrosity. The term “explicitation,” from the Latin explicare, means “to
unfold”, “to unravel”, “to explain” and refers to the act of informing, bringing forward
what was kept implied, making known what was unknown while being latent. In Foams,
the last volume of the Spheres trilogy, German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk writes that:
The Brain Without the Body? Virtual Reality, Neuroscience and the Living Flesh
Angles, 2 | 2016
6
“Not  only  explicitations  make  explicit  unspoken  and  underlying  assumptions
(‘unconscious’, unknown, misunderstood), but they raise ‘realities’ so far hidden in the
folds  of the  latency  at  the  level  of  apparent  existence.”  (2005:  184-185).  In  this
perspective, AlloBrain appears to me as a setting in picture of a monstrous Unheimliche
because something does not make sense. But what is it that does not make sense? And
why did  an uncanny feeling take possession of  me when I  experienced AlloBrain?  I
would  like  to  answer  this  question in  a  summarised,  and yet  almost  obvious,  way:
because of the way the psyche itself works.
 
Physicality and the Mind-body problem
13 How  is  it  possible  that,  out  of  the  brain,  out  of  a material  organisation,  however
complex it may be, something like consciousness may emerge? This question is central
to  neuroscience  and  cognitive  science,  whose  project  is  to  give  a  “materialist
explanation of the mind” (Le Blanc, 2014: 102), particularly in its cognitive dimension.
For  these  research  fields,  a  project  of  the  “naturalisation  of  man”  is  undertaken,
making man “an animal like the others”, as suggested by French philosopher Francis
Wolff  (2010:  131-132).  Through this  naturalisation,  scientists  try  to  make man fully
explainable by his material foundations, any feature that would be owned exclusively
by man is erased, any strangeness irreducible to the rest of the living brushed away,
which results in the removal of all boundaries between man, animal and, of course,
machine.  There  would  be  no  “ghost  in  the  machine,”  in  the  words  of  Gilbert  Ryle
(2002).  There  would  be  no  enigma  or  mystery  of  the  mind.  As  suggested  by
neuropsychiatrist  and  neurobiologist  Jean-Didier  Vincent,  physicalism  —  i.e.
considering that absolutely everything in man, as in everything else, is reducible to
physical properties, or that nothing exists beyond the material —, “fed successively by
pharmacology, molecular biology, neuroinformatics and finally by brain imaging, took
the  psyche,  now  lost  heart  and  soul  in  neural  networks.”  (2007:  30).  In  short,
consciousness  would  be  merely  an  emergence  of  matter  organized  in  a  complex
manner, whether organic, artificial, digital, or made of silicon.
14 Consciousness would only be a mere epiphenomenon resulting from physiochemical
phenomena occurring in the brain, the brain itself being a mere neuron system. For
cognitivists,  the mind and mental processes could be defined as simple information
processing whose matrix is the brain. The brain would function like a computer and the
mind would be a software program, a series of algorithms. In his book L’homme neuronal,
French  neurobiologist  Jean-Pierre  Changeux  argued  that  “it  is  enough  to  say  that
consciousness is a regulation operating system. Man has therefore nothing to do with
the ‘Spirit,’ he only needs to be a Neuronal Man.” (1983: 211) On this new concept of the
neuronal man, Wolff declared:
[M]an is a natural being, like all the others; it is an animal, no more no less. Not
only has man no essence [...], and therefore all barriers that once enclosed him in
essence should be abolished, but he even does not have a proper being — that is
what constitutes the originality of this new figure. For the first time, science studies
man itself assuming that none of its properties fundamentally distinguishes him
from other natural beings, or even from some artificial beings. (2010: 131-132)
15 Consequently, one could reproduce the emergence of consciousness in silico. That is the
purpose of  strong artificial  intelligence proponents,  which try  to  provide machines
with  intelligence,  that  is to  say  with  the  ability  to  reason  logically,4 but  also  with
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psychological  awareness  and  phenomenal  consciousness.5 According  to  Australian
philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers, psychological awareness refers to
the ability to know one’s internal states as well as those of one’s environment, while
phenomenal consciousness refers to the capacity to experience these states in the first
person (“I”) (1996: 25-31). The strong artificial intelligence project is therefore trying to
create machines possessing all human behaviours and abilities, or even able to exceed
them, leading to the much-talked-about fear of a competition between machines and
mankind, which would lead to the latter’s outright extinction. This idea can be found in
the notorious transhumanist interviews and texts with Kevin Warwick. According to
him, “The way things are going, it is soon [the computer] that will make the decisions,
not  us.  If  we  want  to  maintain  our  edge,  we  must  progress  at  the  same  pace.
Technology may turn against us. Unless we merge with it.” (Cited in Boltanski, 2002).
 
Phenomenal consciousness, subjective experience
and the living flesh
16 The  same  idea  motivates  the  mind-uploading  project  defended  by  researchers  in
Artificial  Intelligence  such  as  Hans  Moravec,  Ray  Kurzweil  or  Marvin  Minsky.6 For
them, the mind or the brain itself, reduced to its content, could be downloaded online
or in a computer, ridding it of its flesh and of its finitude. To go back to AlloBrain, it
seems at  first  that  we  deal  with  the  same reduction as  cognitive  science  operates,
describing the mind as a by-product of the brain. But we witness a major shift in the
thought of Marcos Novak when we compare AlloBrain to Dancing with the Virtual Dervish.
While in the latter project, the architect proposed to recognize the physicality of the
mind, that the mind makes the body, questioning the meanders of our interiorities,
with AlloBrain the pattern seems to be reversed. Is this not a project trying to explain
the mind by mere brain matter? The interior that is given to explore is not that of the
mind or the consciousness but, very strictly, that of the brain. Thus, is not interiority in
itself erased? What appears to me as properly monstrous is that what is exposed to our
view is  not phenomenological  flesh,  living and lived-in flesh,  but a brain without a
body, without flesh, a bare and digitally-reconstructed inside that appears empty of
interiority. Consequently, it is impossible to recognize ourselves in it. Therefore, what
is  questioned is  the impossible,  the unspeakable,  the indescribable that makes man
man, as can be seen and lived only by him. 
17 Interestingly, Jean-Didier Vincent states that “the brain is the scream of the flesh!”
(Atlan, Droit, 2012: 179), and AlloBrain, as an immersive environment, is indeed a lived
environment,  and  one  that  is  lived  in  the  first  person,  to  boot.  This  “I,”  this
phenomenal, subjective and embodied consciousness, goes into ecstasy, suffers, feels
disgust and shame, says “no,” exists, resists being reduced to a brain, however complex
and what’s more, resists any explanation:
If the physical structure of reality — the particle distribution, the force fields in
space-time  —  is  logically  consistent  with  the  absence  of  consciousness,  so
something  resists  explanation.  The  presence  of  consciousness  would  be  a
supplement, an extra compared to the world. And on this point, we must recognize
that, at present, there is no valid answer. (Atlan, Droit, 2012: 208) 
18 Furthermore, according to Francis Wolff,  “not only do we not know how to explain
[consciousness], but we do not even know what an explanation would be.” (2010: 352).
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Thereby, the uncanny effect produced by the immersion in AlloBrain seems to me to
result from this confrontation between phenomenal consciousness and representation
in which we are immersed: a digital reconstruction of a material brain that, firstly, is
inside us, is ours, but appears to us as strange and bizarre; secondly, that only offers us
an “unreasonable silence,” in the words of Albert Camus (1942: 42), that is to say, an
absence of response to the question of the “why” of consciousness.
19 Indeed, I think that it is the question of the “why” — and not that of the “how” which
neuroscience and cognitive science try to solve — that Marcos Novak explores in this
project: the why of interiority, of a psyche, a consciousness that does not make sense
with  a  simple  neuron system.  Even if  they  emerge  naturally  through this  complex
material organisation, nothing tells us why they actually emerge. This obscurity, this
unanswered question, gives rise to the absurd which is not necessarily a dereliction,
but  rather  an amazement,  recognising that  we still  resist,  that  something like  this
phenomenal and subjective “I” — that, if  inexplicable, is not less than that through
which we experience the world, by which we are in the world, by which we exist — is
the fact of a life that traverses the body and is totally attached to it, a life of which we
certainly  know  the  “how”  (biological  evolution)  but  of  which  the  “why”  remains
indefinite,  mysterious.  What,  then,  is  the  purpose  of  AlloBrain?  What  does  AlloBrain
induce? I think that this environment allows us to return to the physical body, to the
lived and living flesh, focusing on a body that nonetheless is foreign to us. For there is
always  something  resisting,  and  that  thing  which  resists  and  is  not  captured  by
digitisation, the thing that causes the uncanny feeling, may be the “I” itself, the “I” by
which we experiment our body as well as the world.
 
To have a body/to be a body: mind-uploading as an
abandonment of the world?
20 Let’s return to the question of mind-uploading. Supporters of this project consider that
we could upload ourselves in the computer and still remain absolutely the same. In fact,
Marvin Minsky, Hans Moravec and others appear to underestimate — in a quite radical
way — how our bodies are involved in the construction of our identities. They consider
that economising the materiality of the body does not change who we are. But not only
do I have a body like I would have a tool, I am a body! My body is me, entirely. The “I”
and the body, the body as Leib, the living flesh, are intimately intertwined, and it is only
by this interlacing that I am in the world, that I can experience it, that I can participate
in the world and in its life. Thus, when transhumanists talk about abandoning the flesh,
this “meat” that is a burden to them, are they not voicing the “fatigue of being,” in the
words of Alain Ehrenberg (2000) or Jean-Michel Besnier (2009)? Is not mind-uploading a
project that is actually leading to the abandonment of the world? These are rhetorical
questions, no doubt. In my view, the mind-uploading fantasy is just one of the latest
figures  in  a  crisis  of  dwelling  already  denounced  by  German  philosopher  Martin
Heidegger in 1946 and then by Sloterdijk, among others. This crisis impacts our being
in the  world  as  well  as  our  inhabitation of  the  body,  as  our  being in  the  world  is
intrinsically embodied. This story is profoundly linked to that of the disenchantment of
the world, going back much further than the twentieth century, and even beyond the
three narcissistic wounds identified by Freud.7
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21 Within a disenchanted world, without a stable ground on which to be anchored, the
“extremist  transhumanists”  wish  to  set  sail  in  the  ocean  of  information,  in  the
immaterial data networks. They want to leave the world and the body by which they
have been related to the world, leaving out what made them men, fleeing the human
condition. The transhumanist dream is utopian, perhaps even dystopian. Nonetheless,
its radicalism is symptomatic. As Fréderic Neyrat argues: “the contemporary subject
lives exposed, he does no longer know if he lacks an Outside world or, more cruelly —
but  symmetrically  —  an  Inside  one,  an  inhabitable  interior  worthy  of  the  name.”
(Neyrat, 2006). Undoubtedly cybernetics has participated in this hesitation, through the
denial  of  interiority  that  it  promoted,  and  through  the  development  of  cognitive
science and neuroscience it carried with it, which seem imbued with the same refusal
of the notion of insideness. The body “hides a strange depth that is bound up with the
unconscious, with the animality that is inside us, with this discharge part that does not
find meaning in cybernetics.” (Coulombe, 2009: 44-45). In our digital era, the body, the
unconscious and consciousness, all that we traditionally use to define humankind, no
longer make sense. But have they ever made sense?
 
Conclusion 
22 A  brain  without  a  body:  what  a  strange  proposal!  In  his  seminal  essay  on  “The
Uncanny”, Freud stated that the spectacle of severed limbs waving in every direction as
independent parties, provoked one of the strongest feelings of the uncanny (1919, 2003:
150). AlloBrain goes further. By making us experience the inside of a cerebral space,
making us enter it as if we were penetrating a new world, engaging our full bodies, it
helps  us  contemplate  one  of  the  most  intriguing  questions  that  men  have  asked
themselves, if not one of the most intriguing questions. Why are we what we are? Why
are we conscious of what we are, with our flesh, under the sky and on the ground of
this world, saying “I”, living in the first person? Here lies the uncanniness of a project
such as AlloBrain@AlloSphere. If the human condition can be absurd, let’s dare to make
one last statement: we are human because we have and are a body. That is not to say
that by uploading our minds or our brains in networks we will no longer be human. It
would be disregarding the fact that, as Henri Atlan said, “nobody really knows what
[t]he idea of Man, with a capital M, refers to,” (in Atlan and Droit: 78-79) or, in the
words of Atlan and Droit:
[T]he only worthwhile definition [of the human being] is known, and it is not going
very far. It essentially says that man is a blank page, the only living being to build,
to confront the void that constitutes him and in which he has to write a story that is
known by no one, and certainly not by him, before he invents it. (2012: 10)
23 This is why I believe the issue of posthumanity is entirely based on an illusion. The idea
of an end of the human, indicated by the prefix “post-,” of an exit of the human species
or a rupture with it, suggests that there is a humanity which it would be possible to
transcend. If there is no longer such a thing as Man but only a “becoming human,” the
danger  is  not  that  of  a disappearance  of  humanity  but  of  inhumanity,  which  is
consubstantial to man, “the human species proper” according to Atlan (2007: 22-23).
Transhumanists are looking towards posthumanity, but at the end of the road, there is
no posthuman, only the inhuman.
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NOTES
1. This conference was held at the Villa San Giovanni, 28 June - 1 July 2001. More information is
available online at: http://www.psychiatryonline.it/node/2580.
2. In Spanish mythology, the duende is a fairy or goblin-like creature. According to Lorca, it is a
spirit which is revealed in the practice of dance, song, recited poetry, flamenco or tauromachy.
(2007)
3. More  information  on  the  Brain  Mapping  Center  is  available  online  at:  http://
www.bmap.ucla.edu.
4. From Latin intellegere,  intelligence means the faculty of understanding, of discerning or of
forging  representations  and  manipulating  them  logically,  that  is  to  say  reasoning.  For  the
pioneers of artificial  intelligence (John von Neumann, Norbert Wiener, Claude Shannon, Alan
Turing,  Herbert  Simon,  Marvin  Minsky,  etc.)  —  a  research  field  developed  in  the  1950s  — 
intelligence, reasoning faculty, has been reduced to a calculation (“reason” comes from the Latin
ratio,  which  means  “calculation”),  to  a  program  that  can  operate  regardless  of  its  support,
organic or made of silicone. The pioneer, Alan Turing published in 1950 the article “Computing
Machinery and Intelligence”, in the journal Mind,  exposing the experiment called the “Turing
test”. In 1951, he also gave a conference for the BBC entitled “Can Digital Computers Think?”
5. Strong artificial intelligence project differs from the soft artificial intelligence one in that the
latter produce machines or computer programs roughly simulating intelligence, acting as if they
were intelligent.
6. Interestingly, the idea of mind-uploading was already present in the thought of the famous
father of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener. In The Human Use of Human Beings, he wrote: “It is amusing
as well as instructive to consider what would happen if we were to transmit the whole pattern of
the  human  body,  of  the  human  brain  with  its  memories  and  cross  connections,  so  that  a
hypothetical  receiving  instrument  could  re-embody  these  messages  in  appropriate  matter,
capable of continuing the processes already in the body and the mind, and of maintaining the
integrity needed for this continuation by a process of homeostasis.” (1989: 96) A few pages later,
he added: “the fact that we cannot telegraph the pattern of a man from one place to another
seems to be due to technical difficulties […]. The idea itself is highly plausible.” (1989: 103-104).
7. “The disenchantment of the world, the loss of standards and the decline of the sense are not to
me unavoidable  consequences  of  scientific  progress  in  itself  but  the  result  of  a  much older
renunciation of the whole by man. This same denial is the cause of forgetfulness of Being. By his
creative will,  which was simultaneously a rupture, somehow man extracted himself from the
world; he has lost its place and its base within it. This is what it means to forget the Being: losing
place in the harmony of the world. It was probably the condition of its entry into history, the
price to pay for this wonderful adventure of domination, and somehow in the best case,  the
conscious creation by man of the manifested world. But now, weaned off forces of life, deaf to the
voice of nature, contemptuous of the energy of dreams, man is divorcing with his original world
and thus deprived of real reasons to live in it.” (Perol, in Taleb, 2002: 157)
ABSTRACTS
Since  the  early  1990s,  the  architect  and  artist  Marcos  Novak  has  been  developing  an
experimental and transdisciplinary practice at a point of convergence between architecture, art,
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science, technology and philosophy, questioning the becoming of the digitally-enhanced body.
With AlloBrain@AlloSphere, a virtual reality environment developed between 2005 and 2009 with
the support of the Brain Mapping Center (University of California, Los Angeles), Novak proposes
an immersive exploration of our brain spaces. AlloBrain is modelled from brain MRIs, extruded in
the form of a three-dimensional volume. The experience offered is that of an immersion inside
our  heads.  However,  in  this  way  of  looking  beyond  the  face,  we  find  it  hard  to  recognise
ourselves. Projections or exteriorisations of a hidden interiority, the showing of these unknown
territories  of  the  body,  of  this  anonymous and subterranean singularity,  arouse  an uncanny
feeling in us. The explored interior is not that of the mind or of consciousness but, very strictly,
that of the brain, more precisely that of a brain without a body, without flesh, a bare and digitally
reconstructed enclosed space that yet appears empty of interiority. Are we dealing with a project
that  tries  to  explain  the  mind  by  mere  brain  matter,  similar  to  the  cognitive  sciences  or
neurosciences? Still, the effect of uncanniness produced by the immersion in AlloBrain seems to
result from the confrontation between this “naked brain” and our subjective experience, which
seems unable to dispose of the physical body we inhabit and that inhabits us, too. Thus, what
AlloBrain causes  is  a  real  return  to  the  flesh,  a  lived-in  and  living  flesh,  highlighting  a
particularity that is nonetheless alien to us, because in reality something always resists. It not
the thing that cannot be captured by digitisation the phenomenal “I” itself, the “I” by which we
experience our body and the world? Such a hypothesis would give us ground to doubt that by
avoiding the materiality of the body, by uploading our minds in the machine, we could remain
the same.
Marcos Novak, architecte et artiste, développe depuis trente ans une pratique expérimentale et
transdisciplinaire au point de rencontre entre architecture, art, sciences, nouvelles technologies
et  philosophie,  interrogeant  les  devenirs  du  corps  augmenté  par  le  numérique.  Dans
l’environnement de réalité virtuelle AlloBrain@AlloSphere (2005-2009), élaboré avec l’aide du Brain
Mapping  Center de  l’Université  de  Los  Angeles  en  Californie,  Novak  propose  une  exploration
immersive  de  nos  espaces  cérébraux.  Environnement  immersif  modélisé  à  partir  d’IRMs
cérébraux extrudés sous la forme d’un volume tridimensionnel, l’expérience d’AlloBrain est bien
celle d’une plongée à l’intérieur même de notre crâne. Dans cette percée au-delà du visage, nous
peinons  cependant  à  nous  reconnaître.  Projections  ou  extériorisations  d’une  intériorité
dissimulée, la monstration de ces territoires inconnus du corps, de cette singularité anonyme et
souterraine, éveillent en nous le sentiment d’une inquiétante étrangeté. L’intérieur qui nous est
ici donné à explorer n’est pas celui de l’esprit ou de la conscience mais celui, très proprement, du
cerveau, plus encore d’un cerveau sans corps, sans chair, un dedans dénudé et numériquement
reconstruit, un espace qui, s’il est bien intérieur, semble vide d’intériorité. N’avons-nous pas là
affaire à un projet d’explicitation du mental par la seule matière cérébrale, similaire à celui des
sciences  cognitives  ou  des  neurosciences ?  Quoi  qu’il  en  soit,  l’effet  d’étrangeté  que  produit
l’immersion  dans  AlloBrain  nous  semble  résulter  de  la  confrontation  entre  ce  cerveau  nu  et
l’expérience subjective, laquelle paraît ne pouvoir se départir d’un corps physique, corps que
nous habitons autant qu’il  nous habite.  Ainsi,  c’est un véritable retour à la chair,  cette chair
vivante et vécue, que provoque AlloBrain, soulignant un propre qui nous est pourtant étranger.
Car toujours,  quelque chose résiste.  Cette chose-là,  cette chose qui ne peut être saisie par la
numérisation,  n’est-ce  pas  le  « Je »  phénoménal  lui-même,  ce  «  Je  »  par  lequel  nous  faisons
l’épreuve de notre corps comme du monde ? N’y a-t-il pas là de quoi mettre en doute qu’en nous
téléchargeant  dans  la  machine,  qu’en  faisant l’économie  de  la  matérialité  du  corps,  nous
puissions rester les mêmes ?
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